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ABSTRACT 
  A criminal defendant in the United States is innocent until proven 
guilty and has a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and an impartial 
jury. Although the American criminal justice system generally goes to 
great lengths to afford defendants these constitutional rights, 
competing interests may, if not carefully monitored, undermine these 
bedrock principles. This Note argues that a new practice, stemming 
from the victims’ rights movement and developing in criminal 
courtrooms across the country, is one such competing interest. This 
new practice—spectator demonstrations—allows crime victims’ 
family members and supporters to display ribbons, buttons, T-shirts, 
signs, family urns, or any other written or symbolic message to the 
jury while sitting in the audience section of the courtroom, also known 
as the spectators’ gallery. Although the cathartic nature of the 
demonstration may provide benefits to the victims, this Note argues 
that the prejudicial effects on the jury and resulting contravention of 
the defendant’s constitutional rights far outweigh any such 
justification. Consequently, this Note proposes that courts limit 
victims’ rights in this area and ban spectator demonstrations 
completely to eliminate the per se unacceptable risk that they create. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At least 217 defendants have taken their seat in a courtroom and 
listened to the deafening sounds of injustice1: the underlying 
reverberations of poverty, the vigorous drum of coercion and deceit, 
the exploding bombshells of misidentification and faulty evidence, 
and the babbling echo of bad lawyering.2 Fortunately, all 217 of these 
defendants, subjected to the failings of the criminal justice system, 
have been exonerated by DNA evidence.3 Accordingly, these DNA 
exoneration statistics, as well as the fear that this group may only 
constitute a fraction of those convicted of crimes they did not 
commit,4 stimulate interest in identifying “the fundamental flaws in 
the criminal justice system that lead to wrongful convictions.”5 
One source of identifiable concern is the victims’ rights 
movement,6 responsible for increasing victim involvement and 
allowing victims the right to be present and heard at various critical 
stages of judicial proceedings. Although victims’ rights are often 
revered as positive additions to the system,7 every additional victims’ 
 
 1. As of June 1, 2008, 217 people in the United States have been wrongfully convicted of a 
crime and exonerated through DNA evidence. Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 2. This recasts the Innocence Project’s seven most common causes of wrongful 
convictions: (1) eyewitness misidentification, (2) unreliable or limited science, (3) false 
confessions, (4) forensic science fraud or misconduct, (5) government misconduct, (6) 
informants or snitches, and (7) bad lawyering. Innocence Project, Understand the Causes, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 3. Innocence Project, supra note 1. 
 4. See Innocence Project, supra note 2 (“Those exonerated by DNA testing aren’t the 
only people who have been wrongfully convicted in recent decades. For every case that involves 
DNA, there are thousands that do not.”). 
 5. See id. (describing how the number of DNA exonerations has brought attention to the 
problems inherent in the criminal justice system and the necessity of fixing the system). 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 
835, 837 (“[O]nly by integrating victims into the federal rules will Congress’s goal of making 
victims participants in the process be fully realized.”); Karyn Ellen Polito, Note, The Rights of 
Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 241, 241 (1990) (“Victims of crime should have 
recognized roles in the judicial system.”); Note, Victims’ Roles in the Criminal Justice System: A 
Fallacy of Victim Empowerment?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 225, 236–37 (1992) 
(discussing several advantages of victim participation). But see Robert C. Black, Forgotten 
Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Participation in Sentencing, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 227 
(1994) (“It is a source of outrage to some that defendants enjoy more rights than victims. It 
ought not to be. . . . Victims’ rights bestowed by statute are necessarily subordinate to 
defendants’ constitutional rights in case of conflict.” (citation omitted)). 
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right raises the question: is the right eroding the defendant’s 
presumption of innocence and constitutional right to a fair trial?8 
Much of the existing research on victims’ rights has concerned victim 
impact statements at sentencing hearings,9 victim involvement in plea 
bargaining,10 mandated victim involvement in domestic violence 
cases,11 and the potential effects of victim involvement on a 
prosecutor’s ability to remain a neutral and impartial “minister of 
justice.”12 Creating arguably one of the most divisive debates about 
victims’ rights, however, are victim or spectator demonstrations in the 
courtroom during trial, which have further entangled the victim in the 
criminal justice system. To put the issue into context, consider the 
following scenario: 
Everyday, juror number five sits in a wooden jury box. He and 
eleven other jurors have sworn, under oath, to be impartial fact 
finders despite the highly publicized nature of the criminal murder 
trial in which they sit. Juror number five attempts to focus on the 
expert witness of the day, but notices that a little girl in the spectators’ 
gallery is holding a brass urn. In fact, he notices this little girl every 
 
 8. See, e.g., Rachel King, Why a Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: 
Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 362 (2000) (“By endowing 
constitutional rights on a ‘victim’ after a person has been accused of a crime, but before 
conviction, there is a presumption made that the accused is in fact guilty. This erodes the 
presumption of innocence—a cornerstone of our criminal justice system.”); see also Erin Ann 
O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 233–34 (2005) 
(“[V]ictim involvement in the criminal process is becoming and will continue to be a reality of 
our criminal justice process. . . . As a consequence, advocates must think creatively about how to 
provide victims with participation at a minimal cost to existing procedural protections for 
defendants.”). 
 9. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“A State may legitimately conclude 
that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is 
relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”). 
 10. See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 
303–04 (1987) (examining whether victims should be afforded a right to participate in the plea 
bargain); David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and Victim 
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 854 (1992) (discussing how victim 
participation can be a positive addition to the plea bargaining process). 
 11. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (1996) (discussing the tension behind 
requiring a victim to testify in a domestic violence case). 
 12. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty 
of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 561 (2005) (discussing potential ethical conflicts 
that may develop as a result of victim involvement); see also Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: 
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132 
(2004) (discussing the barriers that impede prosecutorial neutrality). 
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day. She belongs to the select group of people who sit in the front 
row, across from the bailiffs’ post, and watch the trial. 
During the first week, the group passed out T-shirts. Although 
juror number five hardly gave them a second glance because the T-
shirt graphics were too small to read, last week he definitely noticed 
the bright-orange buttons they all wore showing the face of the 
murder victim. It was only then that he realized this group was the 
family of the murder victim, and their involvement began to make 
him a little uneasy. 
Today, there are one, two, three . . . six of them. As juror number 
five drudges through what he hopes to be the last expert witness, he 
cannot help but stare at the brass urn that sits on the little girl’s lap. 
He studies its detail and wonders whether it contains the remains of 
the little girl’s father. He wonders what the family members are 
thinking, why they feel so strongly about the defendant’s guilt, and 
whether they will be able to go on after this tragedy. And suddenly he 
feels an immense pressure as he realizes that the defendant’s fate—
and the family’s fate—is solely in his and the other juror’s hands. 
This example illustrates various forms of spectator 
demonstrations—courtroom displays, worn, held, or otherwise touted 
by a crime victim’s family member or supporter during the 
proceedings at trial. Although the example is only speculative of a 
juror’s actual thoughts, the example is well within the realm of 
possibilities. Spectators have already donned large colorful buttons or 
badges depicting their loved ones,13 buttons advocating for a certain 
cause,14 ribbons,15 T-shirts with written or symbolic messages on 
them,16 and urns containing their loved ones’ ashes.17 Furthermore, to 
 
 13. E.g., Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450, 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (describing how 
defendant asked that spectators be “ordered to remove large buttons portraying a color 
photograph of the deceased”). 
 14. E.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing how defendant 
“contended that jurors were in the presence of a large number of women wearing ‘Women 
Against Rape’ buttons”). 
 15. E.g., In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 616 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (describing how victims’ 
family members wore “black and orange remembrance ribbons while in the courtroom”). 
 16. E.g., State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 29 (Kan. 1998) (“[T]he family members were wearing 
t-shirts with a picture of [the victim] on them.”). 
 17. There are no cases that discuss urns. While conducting interviews in preparation for 
this Note, however, one prosecutor who overheard the interview added that one of her victim’s 
family members brought an urn with the victim’s remains into the courtroom, apparently for 
others to see, and the judge was going to have to rule on it. For an explanation of the prosecutor 
interviews conducted for this Note, see infra note 23. 
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bring attention to their displays, some have cradled sleeping babies,18 
walked in and out of the courtroom,19 or served refreshments.20 
Consequently, the question posed here is twofold: why are spectator 
demonstrations allowed, and are they potentially biasing the jury and 
trial outcomes? 
In answering these questions, this Note suggests that the 
phenomenon of allowing spectator demonstrations is the result of the 
victims’ rights movement, which has influenced courts to adopt legal 
balancing tests that award rights to both spectators and defendants. 
These legal balancing tests, however, only create confusion in the 
courts and qualify guaranteed constitutional protections. This Note 
argues that this technique, especially in light of the possible 
prejudicial effects that spectator demonstrations may have on the 
jury—including diverting jurors’ attention, creating biased priming 
manipulations, and altering courtroom availability heuristics—is 
fundamentally flawed. Fortunately, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that it had not previously applied a legal balancing test to 
spectator conduct and that it was “an open question in our 
jurisprudence,”21 creating an opportunity to implement a new, 
uniform standard in the law. By illuminating the inherent 
inconsistencies and inadequacies that stem from legal balancing tests 
applied in this context, which allow courts to unevenly apply the law, 
this Note contends that courts should ban spectator demonstrations 
completely, arguing that in and of themselves spectator 
demonstrations create a per se unacceptable risk. 
This Note consists of three parts. Part I tracks the evolution of 
the case law regarding spectator conduct in and around the 
courtroom. Part II introduces the Supreme Court’s pivotal 2006 
decision, Carey v. Musladin,22 and illustrates the competing views on 
spectator demonstrations through prosecutorial anecdotes.23 Part III 
 
 18. See State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 454 (W. Va. 1985) (“Some cradled sleeping 
infants in their laps and all prominently displayed their MADD buttons.”). 
 19. See State v. Nelson, 705 So. 2d 758, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“The court further 
requested that the spectators not wander in and out of the courtroom, but rather remain seated, 
so as to minimize the effect of the t-shirts.”). 
 20. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1990) (contending that the button wearers 
“served refreshments outside the courtroom on behalf of the state”). 
 21. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653–54 (2006). 
 22. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006). 
 23. In preparation for this Note, prosecutors were interviewed about their experiences, 
relationships, and views about victim and spectator conduct in the courtroom. The interviews 
were conducted in 2007 and 2008 with current and former state prosecutors across the country. 
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rebuts the pro–spectator rights arguments set forth in Part II and 
argues for a total ban on spectator demonstrations. First, it dispels the 
myth that a victim or spectator has a First Amendment right to free 
speech in the courtroom that deserves heightened protection. Second, 
it discusses the ways in which spectator demonstrations may prejudice 
the jury. This Note concludes that courts ought to completely ban 
spectator demonstrations because “the risk of prejudice [is] profound, 
[and] the burden of alleviating that risk [is] minimal.”24 
I.  THE EVOLUTION: FROM DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS  
TO SPECTATORS’ RIGHTS 
Spectator conduct in the courtroom has evolved from unruly 
spectators who scream, laugh, and point to “well-behaved” spectators 
who flaunt their signs, buttons, and T-shirts. Surprisingly, however, 
not only has the conduct itself evolved but also, and more 
importantly, the ideologies of the judges have evolved. Whereas 
judges were once willing and maybe even anxious to prevent 
prejudicial convictions, the evolving case law suggests a willingness to 
disregard potential prejudicial effects of spectator demonstrations. 
Why is this happening? Is the explicit message of an outburst more 
detrimental than the implicit message of a silent demonstration? Has 
the image of the weak and susceptible juror been replaced by that of 
the impervious mental giant unaffected by extraneous influences? Or, 
are twenty and twenty-first-century courts simply willing to give 
spectators, the majority of whom are victims, a little more freedom? 
This Part tracks the evolution of the law, suggesting that the advent of 
victims’ rights and the fact that many demonstrators are victims or 
victims’ family members has contributed to the judiciary’s response to 
spectator demonstrations. 
A. Historical Treatment of Spectators 
Historically, courts have been quick to shield juries from the 
potentially biasing influence of third parties in the courtroom. In pre–
victims’ rights cases, interruptions to court proceedings primarily 
 
All prosecutors were guaranteed anonymity. Therefore, their responses throughout the Note 
are only identifiable by number. 
 24. Norris, 918 F.2d at 834. 
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involved spectator outbursts.25 Spectator outbursts occur when 
courtroom audience members engage in behavior that is typically 
spontaneous, such as “applause, laughter, yells and shrieks, or 
statements,” during court proceedings.26 After such an outburst, it was 
not uncommon for judges to grant a new trial.27 Because judges had 
difficulty preventing outbursts completely, however, when evaluating 
an outburst’s prejudicial effect, reviewing courts evaluated the judge’s 
actions.28 When a judge promptly and effectively terminated the 
possibility of a reoccurrence, the verdict stood.29 On the other hand, 
when the judge failed to immediately restore order in the court, 
appellate courts often reversed the verdict for fear that the failure to 
quell the outburst contributed to an unfair trial.30 Furthermore, many 
courts held that individual jurors’ opinions about whether they could 
disregard the demonstration and render an unbiased verdict were 
 
 25. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence 
of Jury During Criminal Trial as Basis for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 659 
(1984) (detailing spectator demonstrations in a variety of cases). 
 26. Id. § 2. 
 27. See id. (describing a number of situations in which courts granted new trials when 
“prejudice in fact resulted or might have occurred”). 
 28. See id. (leaving “[t]he decision of whether the jury was or possibly could have been 
influenced [by a spectator demonstration] . . . [primarily] up to the discretion of the trial court”). 
 29. See, e.g., Hallman v. United States, 410 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1979) (affirming a denial of 
a request for a mistrial when a woman in the public seating area of the courtroom began to cry 
during the prosecutor’s opening statement, because the individual was taken out of the 
courtroom and the judge immediately admonished the jury to decide the case only on the facts); 
Stevens v. State, 20 S.E. 331, 331 (Ga. 1893) (syllabus by the court) (finding no cause for a new 
trial when “the presiding judge promptly rebuked the offender, and had him removed from the 
court room”); State v. Wheelock, 254 N.W. 313, 316 (Iowa 1934) (“The outburst was promptly 
suppressed . . . . [and] the trial court had the entire situation well in hand.”); Shimniok v. State, 
19 So. 2d 760, 766 (Miss. 1944) (en banc) (finding no grounds for reversal when the judge 
restored order to the courtroom after an outburst and “instructed the sheriff that all persons 
must be seated; that there was to be no talking, or comments, or show of pleasure or 
displeasure, and that quiet must prevail in the courtroom”); Floyd v. State, 148 So. 226, 232 
(Miss. 1933) (finding a fair trial when the audience “applauded because they thought the jury 
selection had been completed and that the trial on its merits would proceed [and] [t]he judge 
stated that there should be no more applause”). 
 30. See, e.g., Stumph v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ky. 1966) (noting that it is 
“the duty of the court to maintain order in the courtroom. . . . [and] the trial court should take 
appropriate action” when there is a spectator outburst); Hickox v. State, 253 S.W. 823, 830 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1923) (“The court should have sharply reprimanded the audience . . . [and] if this 
did not have the desired effect [the judge] should have promptly cleared the courtroom of 
spectators . . . [and] if this could not be accomplished, then the defendant should have been 
promptly granted a new trial.”); Manning v. State, 39 S.W. 118, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897) 
(reversing a conviction for slander because the trial judge, after one demonstration, should have 
curtailed any subsequent actions). 
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irrelevant, and to ask them for such opinions midtrial was 
unnecessary.31 Although judges understood that not all spectator 
outbursts could be remedied by overturning convictions,32 curative 
steps taken to quell those acts were important when evaluating 
prejudice33 and determining whether to grant a new trial.34 Overall, 
this behavior by reviewing courts shows that spectator outbursts were 
seen as per se unacceptable risks in pre–victims’ rights cases. 
In addition to this historical procedural protocol, U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions reveal a consistent, historical concern for preventing 
third parties from prejudicing juries. For instance, in Turner v. 
Louisiana,35 the Supreme Court focused on the importance of an 
“impartial” and “indifferent” jury.36 In Turner, two sheriffs were in 
charge of the jury.37 Specifically, these sheriffs “drove the jurors to a 
restaurant for each meal,” took them to their “lodgings each night,” 
and were otherwise closely associated with them.38 Therefore, the 
judge reversed the defendant’s conviction39 when the same sheriffs 
 
 31. See, e.g., Woolfolk v. State, 8 S.E. 724, 727 (Ga. 1889) (holding that the combination of 
applause and screams of “hang him” warranted a new trial because “[t]he question here is not 
what effect these things did have upon the minds of the jury, but what effect they were 
calculated to produce”); State v. Henry, 198 So. 910, 923 (La. 1940) (“It was, therefore, error for 
the trial judge to substitute for his own opinion the conclusions of the jurors as to the effect and 
influence that the extraneous misconduct of bystanders and spectators had on them.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 25 S.W. 967, 967–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894) (“[T]o make a 
rule that a judgment will be reversed because of such applauding, in all cases, though promptly 
suppressed and reprimanded, would be very dangerous indeed. A person . . . would not hesitate 
to have his friends ready and willing to applaud counsel for the state . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., Hendry v. State, 112 So. 212, 214 (Ala. 1927) (“Misconduct of bystanders . . . is 
highly reprehensible, and should not be tolerated. When it occurs, it should be promptly and 
vigorously suppressed in such manner that the jury is made to see the ugliness and injustice of 
such demonstration.”). Another state court held that immediate remedial action by the trial 
court could prevent a mistrial: 
[W]here, as here, improper audience behaviour is purely fortuitous and where the 
court takes immediate steps to quell it and to admonish the jury and the spectators to 
assure no prejudice to the accused, a mistrial may not be required if the audience 
misbehaviour may be reasonably viewed as not having unduly influenced the jury. 
State v. Allen, 276 So. 2d 868, 871 (La. 1973). 
 34. See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 25, § 3(a) (“[D]isruptive conduct of spectators in the 
presence of the jury during the selection of the jury or during the opening arguments constituted 
a basis for a reversal, or the granting of motions for a new trial or mistrial.”). 
 35. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965). 
 36. Id. at 471 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). 
 37. Id. at 467. 
 38. Id. at 468. 
 39. Id. at 474. 
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subsequently testified as witnesses for the prosecution.40 The Court 
specified that the jury’s verdict “must be based upon the evidence 
developed at the trial”41 and that “in spite of forms [juries] are 
extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.”42 
The Court also noted that “even if it could be assumed that the 
[sheriffs] never did discuss the case directly with any members of the 
jury,” the continual interaction between those witnesses and the jury 
suggested extreme prejudice.43 In ruling for the defendant, the Court 
recognized that a “trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies 
at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against a defendant 
shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there 
is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of 
cross-examination, and of counsel.”44 
Similarly, when confronting the disruptive nature of the media 
the following year in Estes v. Texas45 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,46 the 
Court scrutinized other outside influences in the courtroom. 
Concluding that the media prevented a fair trial in Estes, the Court 
noted that the “mass of wires, television cameras, microphones and 
photographers”47 may have distracted the jurors.48 Furthermore, the 
Court stated, “distractions are not caused solely by the physical 
presence of the camera . . . . Human nature being what it is, not only 
will a juror’s eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be 
preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.”49 In 
Sheppard, quoting Justice Holmes, the Court declared, “[t]he theory 
of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be 
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any 
 
 40. Id. at 468. 
 41. Id. at 472 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722). 
 42. Id. (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 43. Id. at 473. 
 44. Id. at 472–73 (emphasis added) (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722). In Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court also upheld a Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing or parading 
near a court, id. at 564. “A State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that 
the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence.” Id. at 562. 
Furthermore, “the legislature has the right to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and 
other court officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or 
near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the trial.” Id. at 565. 
 45. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
 46. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
 47. Estes, 381 U.S. at 550. 
 48. Id. at 546. 
 49. Id. 
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outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.”50 
Concluding that the jury’s subjective assessment of prejudice was not 
dispositive51 and that the judge “did not fulfill his duty . . . to control 
[the] disruptive influences in the courtroom,”52 the Supreme Court 
remanded the case.53 
For the sake of preventing jury prejudice, the Court has also 
administered control over the clothing and appearance of criminal 
defendants. In Estelle v. Williams,54 for example, the “accused [was] 
compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury.”55 
Noting that “jail clothing furthers no essential state policy,” the Court 
determined that the “constant reminder of the accused’s condition 
implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror’s 
judgment. . . . [and] an unacceptable risk is presented of 
impermissible factors coming into play.”56 Even though the verdict 
was ultimately upheld because the defense did not properly make an 
objection to the court,57 Williams established that the State could no 
longer compel a defendant to stand trial wearing identifiable prison 
clothing. 
In another case, Holbrook v. Flynn,58 “four uniformed state 
troopers [sat] in the first row of the spectators’ [gallery]” behind the 
six defendants.59 Upholding the conviction, the Court stated that 
“maintaining custody during the proceedings”60 was extremely 
important.61 Therefore, when the four uniformed officers were only 
there to provide security and did not overwhelm the room, an 
unacceptable risk of prejudice was simply not present.62 Nevertheless, 
the Court qualified its holding by stating, “[w]e do not minimize the 
threat that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might 
pose”63 and “we might express a preference that officers providing 
 
 50. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 363. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 55. Id. at 502. 
 56. Id. at 504–05. 
 57. Id. at 512. 
 58. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 59. Id. at 562. 
 60. Id. at 572. 
 61. Id. at 571–72. 
 62. Id. at 570–72. 
 63. Id. at 570. 
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courtroom security in federal courts not be easily identifiable by 
jurors as guards.”64 The Court thus seemed to retain its protective 
principles related to potential jury prejudice in the courtroom even 
though the State had a “legitimate interest in maintaining custody” of 
the defendant in the case.65 
All of these cases suggest that historically, assuring an impartial 
jury took precedence over other competing interests, including the 
rights of third parties. Thus, the distortion of these established 
principles by select lower courts, allowing increased third-party 
presence in spectator demonstrations, seems unwarranted. Upon 
second glance, however, this shift in the balance between concern for 
jury prejudice and third-party rights came at the heels of a movement 
that brought third-party rights to the forefront of the criminal justice 
system and may have contributed to the abrupt shift in judicial 
philosophy. 
B. Enter Victims’ Rights 
In colonial America, individual victims of crime were the ones in 
charge of “law enforcement and the administration of justice.”66 In 
the early eighteenth century, however, as the broader criminal-justice 
goals of deterrence and retribution started to garner support, once-
private criminal prosecutions became public, and individual victims of 
crime had to yield their control to government prosecutors.67 It was 
not until the 1970s, at the start of the victims’ rights movement, that 
victims finally started to regain their footing in the eyes of the 
arguably unreceptive government-run criminal justice system.68 With 
the creation of President Ronald Reagan’s President’s Task Force on 
Victims of Crime in the 1980s69 and the work of the National Victims 
Constitutional Amendment Network in the 1990s,70 the movement 
truly came into its own.71 
 
 64. Id. at 572. Furthermore, the Court upheld the long-existing view that a juror’s opinion 
of the prejudicial nature of the incident is not dispositive. Id. at 570. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen 
Years After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 21, 25 (1999). 
 67. Id. at 21–27. 
 68. Id. at 27–29. 
 69. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17, 975 (Apr. 23, 1982). 
 70. See Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the Constitution: Moving from 
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1055 
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“By the end of 1994, twenty states had adopted victims’ rights 
amendments,” and in 1995, the first victims’ rights amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution was proposed.72 Since then, all fifty states and the 
federal government have enacted victims’ rights statutes and, in some 
cases, state constitutional amendments.73 Congress also passed the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004,74 helping to solidify the victim’s 
place within the system.75 Although there is no consensus for the 
underlying philosophies of victims’ rights among advocates,76 this 
widespread implementation and codification of victims’ rights 
throughout the country has substantially changed the culture of 
criminal law. 
One scholar notes, “Victims’ rights has emerged . . . as one of the 
most important social movements of our time, comparable in its 
influence on our political culture to the civil rights movement or 
 
(1998) (stating that the National Victims Constitutional Amendment Network “represent[ed] all 
major victims’ rights organizations”). 
 71. See Tobolowsky, supra note 66, at 29–31 (discussing how “victim participation in the 
criminal justice process has increased exponentially in the fifteen years since the issuance of the 
Task Force Final Report”). 
 72. Mosteller, supra note 70, at 1055. A constitutional amendment has not been adopted. 
See H.R. Res. 10, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States to protect the rights of crime victims). 
 73. Protections vary from state to state and often include the right to be present and heard 
at all critical stages of judicial proceedings, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; the right to 
restitution, e.g., The Property Crime Restitution and Compensation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§§ 19-4801 to -13 (2006); the right be informed and make a statement at sentencing, e.g., WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 35; and the right to a timely disposition of the case, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 
24, cl. 1. The federal system has also implemented legislation providing rights to crime victims. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006) (“[A] United States district court shall not order any victim of 
an offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that offense.”). 
 74. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) and to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603(d)–(e)). 
 75. The rights include (1) the “right to be reasonably protected”; (2) the right to 
“reasonable, accurate, and timely notice . . . involving the crime or of release or escape of the 
accused”; (3) the right not to be excluded (absent clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary); (4) the “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding”; (5) the “reasonable 
right to confer with the attorney for the Government”; (6) the “right to full and timely 
restitution”; (7) the “right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay”; and (8) the “right to 
be treated with fairness and with respect.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). For a discussion of the possible 
effects of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, see Matthew B. Riley, Note, Victim 
Participation in the Criminal Justice System: In re Kenna and Victim Access to Presentence 
Reports, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 235, 235–53. 
 76. See Mosteller, supra note 70, at 1054 (identifying three groups of advocates: (1) those 
with the goal of attaining participatory rights, (2) those with a pro-prosecution slant, and (3) 
those who want greater victim aid and protection from the government). 
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feminism.”77 Although jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they 
involve victims, “[t]he role of the victim in the legal process [can start] 
at the beginning of a criminal case,” when the government determines 
whether to “press charges” or offer a plea bargain, can continue to 
trial, in the form of victim testimony, and might not end until the 
sentencing, probation, or parole stage, postconviction.78 Criminal laws 
themselves are also being defined “in part by reference to the status 
or characteristics of the victim . . . even when the defendant is not 
aware of such characteristics.”79 Furthermore, “as socio-legal scholar 
Jonathan Simon reminded us [in 2000]: . . . [a]lmost all demographic 
segments of the population, and both political parties, supported 
[Victims’ Rights] measures,”80 effectively reinforcing the prevalence 
of sympathy for crime victims.81 The heightened awareness of victims 
in the criminal justice system, however, has influenced not only 
legislation but also judges’ decisions, such as approving spectator 
demonstrations. 
C. Resulting Jurisprudence: Spectator Demonstrations 
As spectator conduct in the courtroom evolved from outbursts to 
demonstrations, lower court judges were forced to determine whether 
in certain circumstances spectator demonstrations could warrant a 
new trial in the way that spectator outbursts once did. Importantly, 
these judges were asked to weigh in on this issue beginning in the 
1980s,82 which coincided with the newly publicized victims’ rights 
movement.83 This Section contends that although both spectator 
outbursts and demonstrations are disruptive in nature, the backdrop 
of the victims’ rights movement garnered greater consideration for 
sympathetic victims and their cause when courts were first deciding 
spectator demonstrations cases. Therefore, instead of promptly 
 
 77. Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1136 (2000). 
 78. Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on 
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 654–60 (2003). 
 79. Id. at 658 (referring specifically to assault laws and hate-crime legislation). 
 80. Vik Kinwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered 
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 232 (2002). 
 81. Cf. id. at 233 (“Certainly, the popular sympathy for crime victims is so prevalent that 
there might eventually be sufficient political mobilization to secure the passage of a measure 
like . . . the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 82. For a discussion of court decisions regarding spectator demonstrations, see infra Parts 
I.C.1–3. 
 83. For a discussion of the timeline of the victims’ rights movement, see supra Part I.B. 
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terminating spectator conduct as they had in the outburst cases,84 
many courts were willing to weigh the extent of the particular 
spectator demonstration and give the victims more leeway.85 
Unfortunately, this gesture of respect for those experiencing the loss 
of a loved one may endanger the constitutional principles that shape 
the foundation of the criminal justice system. Yet the resulting 
jurisprudence reveals that not all courts have fallen prey to this 
phenomenon and have upheld the cautionary ideals of the past (the 
status-quo courts). Many courts, however, have given more weight to 
victims’ or spectators’ rights by allowing them to demonstrate during 
trial (the pro-victim courts), a practice this Note argues is a mistake. 
Finally, other courts remain unclear as to what the law for spectator 
demonstrations should be, especially when determining whether to 
apply a legal balancing test (the unsettled courts). 
1. Status-Quo Courts.  Although their approaches vary, the 
status-quo courts seem willing to overturn convictions in cases in 
which spectator demonstrations occur, similar to the precedent set by 
reviewing courts in spectator-outburst cases. For example, in State v. 
Franklin,86 “ten to thirty [Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)] 
demonstrators . . . sat directly in front of the jury.”87 “Some cradled 
sleeping infants in their laps and all prominently displayed their 
MADD buttons.”88 Concerned about the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, the court ruled for the defendant and stated, “the [lower] court’s 
cardinal failure in this case was to take no action whatever against a 
predominant group of ordinary citizens who were tooth and nail 
opposed to any finding that the defendant was not guilty.”89 
In a murder prosecution in which the trial court did take action 
and “sternly admonished” the victim’s family members and ordered 
them to stop wearing large buttons and holding childhood pictures 
depicting the victim, the appellate court did not find prejudice.90 
Similarly, in State v. Lord,91 the defendant objected when thirteen out 
 
 84. See supra Part I.A. 
 85. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 86. State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985). 
 87. Id. at 454. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 455. 
 90. Mitchell v. State, 884 P.2d 1186, 1196 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 91. State v. Lord, 114 P.3d 1241 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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of thirty-one spectators wore buttons portraying the victim on the 
first day of trial.92 At first, the trial court refused to exclude the 
buttons.93 Two days later, however, the judge directed the spectators 
to remove the buttons.94 Upholding the conviction, the court of 
appeals noted, “Although the better practice would have been to 
have prohibited the buttons in the courthouse at first sight, the trial 
court later ordered the buttons removed, in spite of the absence of 
prejudice. . . . [to] avoid[] the possibility of future contamination of 
the jury and prejudice to [the defendant].”95 
In Norris v. Risley,96 a group of women spectators wore “Women 
Against Rape” buttons during the trial.97 The court, noting that “[t]he 
women . . . obviously intended to convey a message,”98 held that the 
exposure to the buttons constituted an unacceptably high risk of 
prejudice in light of the presumption of innocence,99 the right of 
confrontation,100 and the right of cross-examination.101 Finally, in 
another trial that involved the murder of a prison guard, when it 
appeared that “[a]bout half of the spectators [wore] prison guard 
uniforms,”102 the court determined that the demonstration, combined 
with the pretrial publicity of the case, “marred” the trial.103 “The 
officers . . . were there for one reason: they hoped to show solidarity 
with the killed correctional officer . . . [and] communicate a message 
to the jury,” a message that the “jury could not help but receive.”104 
2. Pro-Victim Courts.  In contrast, pro-victim courts depart from 
the status quo and grant extensive rights to spectators. They do so not 
only by inquiring into spectators’ motives and jurors’ assessments of 
potential prejudice but also by trivializing spectator outbursts in a 
 
 92. Id. at 1244. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1245. 
 96. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 97. Id. at 829–30. 
 98. Id. at 832. 
 99. Id. at 831. 
 100. Id. at 833. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1458 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 103. Id. at 1459. The Court, however, clarified its decision in this case, stating “[w]e do not 
mean to imply that presumed prejudice can occur only when there is a combination of 
courtroom demonstrations and pretrial publicity.” Id. at 1460 n.12. 
 104. Id. at 1459–60. 
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way earlier courts did not.105 For example, in In re Woods,106 the 
victims’ family members wore “black and orange remembrance 
ribbons while in the courtroom.”107 When the defendant asked the 
judge to order them to remove the ribbons, the judge decided to 
“ask[] for comment from some of the spectators who were wearing 
the ribbons.”108 After the parent of the murder victim told the judge 
that the ribbons were “‘[j]ust representative of my daughter and the 
tragedy that has taken place’ . . . the trial court declined to order the 
removal of the ribbons.”109 On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Washington noted that the ribbons “were simply ribbons that the 
wearers indicated they wore in memory of the victims.”110 Citing a 
juror, the court continued, “In fact, juror Randall Thornburg 
stated . . . . ‘I thought the ribbons were nice, but they did not 
influence my decision or that of the other jurors.’”111 In another 
homicide prosecution, “the spectator cried and yelled the victim’s 
name for about [thirty-five] seconds,” while a forensic pathologist was 
testifying.112 Rejecting the motion for mistrial, the court reasoned that 
because “[t]he spectator never accused defendant of the victim’s 
murder” and the jury members were told to “disregard the spectator’s 
comments,” there was no constitutional error.113 
3. Unsettled Courts.  Many of the defendants who ultimately 
lose their appeals after trial courts fail to grant mistrials are in 
jurisdictions that are unclear as to how they should treat spectator 
demonstrations. For example, many unsettled courts focus on a 
procedural flaw in the case and avoid the substantive issue. In Pachl 
v. Zenon,114 for example, the court proposed that defense counsel’s 
failure to object to button wearers was likely a reasonable “tactical 
 
 105. For a description of courts’ reluctance to take into account an individual juror’s opinion 
about prejudice and the overall concern for the potential risk of prejudice on the jury before the 
advent of the victims’ rights movement, see supra Part I.A. 
 106. In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 107. Id. at 616. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 617. 
 112. State v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 113. Id.; cf. Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no constitutional 
error when the victim’s teenage daughter may have accused the defendant of murder in a loud 
and emotional display in front of the jury, defendant, and prosecutor). 
 114. Pachl v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc). 
ELIZABETH.DOC 10/31/2008  1:20:04 PM 
2008] THE NEWEST SPECTATOR SPORT 291 
decision” and therefore would not warrant a new trial.115 In Nguyen v. 
State,116 “the record contain[ed] no indication where the individuals 
were sitting, whether they were seated together, or if the jurors did in 
fact see the buttons.”117 Consequently, the reviewing court was unable 
to determine whether it was “reasonably probable” that the buttons 
influenced the jury’s verdict.118 
Other unsettled courts send mixed signals. For example, in State 
v. McNaught,119 the Kansas Supreme Court demonstrated a 
willingness to approve of spectator demonstrations when it upheld 
the defendant’s conviction, stating that “[t]he record in the 
case . . . d[id] not show the factual circumstances present on this 
issue. . . . [and t]he record [was] absolutely silent regarding the 
number of MADD and SADD [Students Against Drunk Driving] 
members . . . [that] wore buttons.”120 A later case by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, however, signaled its disapproval of spectator 
demonstrations.121 Reminding lower courts that an appellate court 
cannot overturn convictions when the record is incomplete, it warned 
that spectator demonstrations were “not a good idea,” and the 
displays should have been removed because of the possibility of 
prejudice.122 
Still other unsettled courts struggled to determine whether the 
Supreme Court precedents in Holbrook v. Flynn and Estelle v. 
 
 115. Id. at 1093. 
 116. Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
 117. Id. at 457. 
 118. Id.; see also State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (“[T]his Court will not 
assume a relationship exists between the murder victims and the spectators wearing the badges 
and thereby infer their intention to influence the jury’s verdicts.”). 
 119. State v. McNaught, 713 P.2d 457 (Kan. 1986). 
 120. Id. at 468. 
 121. State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 (Kan. 1998). 
 122. Id. at 30. The court noted the possibility that spectator demonstrations may lead to 
prejudice: 
In McNaught . . . . [w]e then determined that where the record did not show the 
number of persons wearing buttons, or contain any evidence that the jurors showed 
concern about the buttons, no prejudice or abuse of discretion resulted. 
  . . . As in McNaught, there was no evidence [in this case] regarding the number of 
spectators wearing the buttons or t-shirts and also no evidence that the jurors were in 
any way affected by the buttons or t-shirts. That being said, however, it would seem 
that the wearing of such buttons or t-shirts is not a good idea because of the 
possibility of prejudice which might result. Under the circumstances, it would have 
been better for the district court to have ordered the buttons removed or the t-shirts 
covered up. 
Id. at 29–30 (citation omitted). 
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Williams, which set out the “inherent prejudice” legal balancing 
test,123 were supposed to apply to spectator demonstrations. The 
inherent prejudice test establishes a constitutional violation when an 
“unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into 
play.”124 Some of both the pro-victim courts125 and the status-quo 
courts126 have applied this test to spectator demonstrations, with 
differing results, but many of the unsettled courts were unclear 
whether the Supreme Court mandated the test for spectator 
demonstrations.127 For example, in Billings v. Polk,128 the defendant 
claimed that he was denied a fair trial when “an alternate juror wore 
a T-shirt one day during trial that said ‘No Mercy—No Limits,’ and 
members of the jury saw and joked about the T-shirt.”129 The state 
court “concluded that these facts, even if proven true, were 
insufficient to entitle [the defendant] to relief.”130 Upon review, the 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had not “clearly establish[ed] that a jury’s exposure to 
a T-shirt like the one at issue here amount[ed] to a violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.”131 This flux among lower courts and 
the question regarding the applicability of the inherent prejudice test 
apparently led the Supreme Court to consider the issue in 2006. 
 
 123. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 
570 (1986) (“The only question we need answer is thus whether the presence of these four 
uniformed and armed officers was so inherently prejudicial that respondent was thereby denied 
his constitutional right to a fair trial.”); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 505 (1976) 
(holding that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an 
accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes” because “an 
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play”). 
 124. Williams, 425 U.S. at 505. 
 125. See, e.g., In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (“Many courts have 
used the Holbrook standard and have found that no inherent prejudice exists so as to taint the 
defendant’s right to fair trial from the wearing of buttons or other displays. . . . We conclude, in 
sum, that Woods does not meet the burden of proving that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced 
by the trial court’s action in allowing members of the victims’ families to wear the black and 
orange ribbons in the courtroom.” (citations omitted)). 
 126. See, e.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “Women 
Against Rape” buttons constituted an unacceptably high risk of prejudice). 
 127. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006) (“Reflecting the lack of guidance from 
this Court, lower courts have diverged widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectator-
conduct claims. Some courts have applied Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct. Other 
courts have declined to extend Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct.” (citations omitted)). 
 128. Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 129. Id. at 246. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 247; see also id. at 248 n.6 (“[I]t is not even clear precisely what message, if any, 
the words ‘No Mercy—No Limits’ conveyed . . . .”). 
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II.  THE DEBATE: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS VERSUS DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS 
In 2006, after more than twenty years of variance among the 
lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carey v. 
Musladin, which involved a spectator demonstration. Although it 
seemed that with this case the Supreme Court would finally resolve 
the issue of spectator demonstrations, the Court merely perpetuated 
uncertainty with its decision. This Part introduces the Supreme 
Court’s decision and describes how the decision gave limited 
guidance to lower courts dealing with spectator demonstrations. This 
Part also illustrates conflicting views of the practice using anecdotal 
data from sixteen prosecutors who agreed to be interviewed on this 
topic. Because prosecutors act in the best interest of the state,132 
confer with defense attorneys, answer to judges, and have 
relationships with crime victims or surviving family members,133 they 
can help shed light upon the multiple views and perspectives behind 
spectator demonstrations. By evaluating the contentious elements of 
the spectator demonstrations debate from this anecdotal perspective, 
this Part lays the groundwork for Part III, which challenges these 
demonstrations. 
A. Carey v. Musladin 
In Carey v. Musladin, the defendant stood trial for murder.134 
During the trial, “several members of [the victim’s] family sat in the 
front row of the spectators’ gallery” wearing buttons depicting the 
victim that were visible to the jury.135 Defense counsel moved to order 
the removal of the buttons, but the judge refused.136 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that “the state 
court’s application of a test for inherent prejudice that differed from 
the one stated in Williams and Flynn ‘was contrary to clearly 
 
 132. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation 
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”). 
 133. For a summary of the inherent problems with prosecutorial neutrality in dealing with 
victims, see Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 
HOW. L.J. 475, 483–86 (2006) (noting that prosecutors face external pressures, including “the 
often vocal concerns of the community or particular advocacy groups, such as victims’ rights 
groups”); Medwed, supra note 12, at 145–47 (explaining that prosecutors may “naturally 
develop an allegiance to—and affinity for—the crime victims in their cases”). 
 134. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 651 (2006). 
 135. See id. at 651 & n.1 (“The buttons were two to four inches in diameter.”). 
 136. Id. at 652. 
ELIZABETH.DOC 10/31/2008  1:20:04 PM 
294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:275 
established federal law and constituted an unreasonable application 
of that law.’”137 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue, but quickly 
disposed of the case in a little over one page. The Court held that 
Williams and Flynn, having only dealt with “state-sponsored 
courtroom practices,”138 did not answer the question of whether the 
inherent prejudice test applies to “private-actor courtroom 
conduct.”139 Therefore, the lower courts were not required to follow 
any particular test and the lower court’s decision was not “contrary to 
or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”140 
As a consequence of the majority’s opinion in Carey v. Musladin, 
lower courts were assured that the inherent prejudice test, or any 
legal balancing test for that matter, did not automatically apply. On 
the other hand, the majority had seemingly failed to establish an 
alternative uniform standard for the lower courts to follow. 
Fortunately, the three justices who filed concurring opinions—
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter—offered insight into the 
competing concerns regarding spectator demonstrations. Justice 
Kennedy seemed to support a case-by-case analysis when dealing 
with spectator demonstrations but also thought that courts should 
consider ending the practice all together.141 He stated, “[T]here [was] 
no indication [in this case] . . . of coercion or intimidation to the 
severe extent demonstrated in [Sheppard and Estes].142 But “[it] does 
present the issue whether as a preventative measure, or as a general 
rule to preserve the calm and dignity of a court, buttons proclaiming a 
message relevant to the case ought to be prohibited as a matter of 
course.”143 
Both Justices Stevens and Souter also favored a case-by-case 
approach but advocated applying the inherent prejudice test to both 
 
 137. Id. (quoting Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2005)). The 
defendant in Carey was prosecuted in state court, but the federal district court eventually 
“granted [the defendant] a certificate of appealability on the buttons issue.” Id. 
 138. Id. at 653 (“In Williams, the State compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison 
clothes, and in Flynn, the State seated the troopers immediately behind the defendant.”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 654 (“Reflecting the lack of guidance from this Court, lower courts have diverged 
widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectator-conduct claims.”). 
 141. Id. at 656–57 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 142. Id. at 657. 
 143. Id. 
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state-sponsored practices and private actors’ conduct.144 In applying 
the test, however, Justice Souter stated, “one could not seriously deny 
that allowing spectators at a criminal trial to wear visible buttons with 
the victim’s photo can raise a risk of improper considerations. . . . The 
only debatable question is whether the risk in a given case reaches the 
‘unacceptable’ level.”145 He continued, “[T]wo considerations keep me 
from concluding that the state court acted unreasonably . . . . in failing 
to embrace a no-risk standard.”146 “First, of the several courts that 
have considered the influence of spectators’ buttons, the majority 
have left convictions standing.”147 Second, “in the absence of 
developed argument it would be preferable not to decide whether 
protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by 
spectators’ buttons.”148 Although Justice Stevens agreed with Justice 
Souter’s adoption of the inherent prejudice test and the sentiment 
about the lower courts, he failed to find merit in the First 
Amendment argument.149 
But Justices Stevens’ and Souter’s reluctance to assume “that 
every trial and reviewing judge . . . was unreasonable as well as 
mistaken in failing to embrace a no-risk standard”150 underestimates 
the complexity of the issue. As discussed in Part I.C, some trial courts 
before Carey v. Musladin were unsure whether they were bound by 
the inherent prejudice test,151 and other courts did not rule on the 
substantive issue of spectator demonstrations because the records 
were incomplete.152 Consequently, the debate about the validity of 
 
 144. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 657 (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 145. Id. at 657–58 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 146. Id. at 658. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Justice Stevens dismissed the First Amendment argument: 
[M]y reasons for joining the Court’s judgment in this case are essentially the same as 
those expressed by Justice Souter, with one caveat. In my opinion, there is no merit 
whatsoever to the suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure 
of protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or symbolic speech to 
express any point of view about an ongoing proceeding. 
Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 150. Id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); accord id. at 656 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (adopting Justice Souter’s rationale). 
 151. See supra Parts I.C.1–2; supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra Part I.C.3. Furthermore, State v. Speed, State v. Braxton, State v. Lord, and 
Nguyen v. State, all cases that Justice Souter uses to demonstrate a lack of overturned 
convictions, came from courts whose approach was unsettled. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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spectator demonstrations is still very much alive, and Carey v. 
Musladin has left open an opportunity for reform in this area. 
B. Prosecutorial Perspectives153 
The culture has evolved in terms of the victim’s presence in the 
process. Victim input is a positive change because it keeps the victim 
informed, raises public confidence, and prevents misconceptions. On 
the other hand, however, it is not appropriate to allow victims to 
decide cases . . . [T]hat would border vigilantism.154  
All of the prosecutors who were interviewed for this Note 
understood the tension that spectator demonstrations cause between 
victims’ rights and defendants’ constitutional rights. In evaluating the 
data, three common prosecutorial positions on the practice surfaced. 
First, some supported spectator demonstrations and did not believe 
demonstrations negatively influence the jury (supportive 
prosecutors). Second, some preferred to evaluate all cases on a case-
by-case basis because they believed that some but not all spectator 
demonstrations may affect the jury (case-by-case prosecutors). Third, 
some wished to abolish spectator conduct all together because of the 
influence it may have on the jury (abolitionist prosecutors). The 
following excerpts reveal the arguments proposed by each group and 
give some perspective on the competing interests that surround 
spectator demonstrations. 
The majority of those from the interview sample who constituted 
the supportive prosecutor group were domestic violence prosecutors. 
Regardless of region, political ideology, office, and number of cases 
tried, the domestic violence prosecutors interviewed overwhelmingly 
favored spectator demonstrations. Whether this support stemmed 
from their relationships with victims or the nature of their cases is 
unclear,155 but their message was unambiguous: “Most [jurors] would 
 
 153. Sixteen prosecutors were interviewed for this Note. See supra note 23. 
 154. Interview with Prosecutor No. 3 (Nov. 8, 2007). 
 155. Interestingly, all of the domestic violence prosecutors concur: “The strength of 
domestic violence cases, unlike others, relies heavily on the availability of the victim. We usually 
have more contact with victims and want that contact. There are so many things working against 
us.” This difficulty may fuel their desire to have victim participation in every stage of the 
prosecution. Interview with Prosecutor No. 4 (Nov. 9, 2007); Interview with Prosecutor No. 9 
(Nov. 30, 2007); Interview with Prosecutor No. 10 (Dec. 14, 2007); see also, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, 
No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996) (discussing the need for participation from domestic violence 
victims to “improv[e] the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence”). 
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assume that the family and friends of the victim would be in support 
of that victim. Those things don’t intimidate juries or move them to 
do things that they wouldn’t otherwise do. So, it doesn’t have any 
implications on a fair trial.”156 Similarly, another domestic violence 
prosecutor noted, “I don’t think [spectator conduct is] inflammatory, 
not at all. To deny them the ability to wear something just with a face 
on it . . . that’s [what is] inflammatory. The jury knows that the family 
is hurting.”157 Another put herself in the shoes of the victim’s family 
members: “If it was my son who was murdered, I would not want 
anyone to tell me what I could and couldn’t wear. Wearing a t-shirt or 
something, that would probably be cathartic for me.”158 Importantly, 
not all of the prosecutors who favored spectator demonstrations did 
domestic violence work, but, commonly, the supportive prosecutors 
emphasized the “rights” of the spectators, similar to the First 
Amendment argument proposed by Justice Souter,159 and also, the 
reality that families of crime victims are distraught. 
Based on those interviewed, the case-by-case prosecutors 
consisted of a wide variety of prosecutors, including conservatives, 
liberals, women, and men. As the most diverse group, their primary 
concerns were the spectators’ motives, the number of spectators 
making the demonstration, and the ostentatious nature of the 
displays. One prosecutor, in adopting a position very similar to the 
inherent prejudice standard, said, 
[Spectator conduct] is definitely inflammatory but I’m not sure that 
it violates the defendant’s rights. If it’s just a picture, and not a 
picture of the murder scene or a slogan that says ‘You murdered my 
son,’ I could understand it. But in one case, the family wanted to 
hold up huge signs. The judge had them removed and I agreed with 
that.160 
Many of these prosecutors were very specific about pictures. One 
said, “Definitely no murder scenes or dead victims, no words on the 
pictures . . . but just pictures, like old pictures of the person – that’s 
ok.”161 Others asked questions when asked to comment on the buttons 
in Carey v. Musladin, indicating that certain details would change 
 
 156. Interview with Prosecutor No. 3, supra note 154. 
 157. Interview with Prosecutor No. 9, supra note 155. 
 158. Interview with Prosecutor No. 4, supra note 155. 
 159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 160. Interview with Prosecutor No. 4, supra note 155. 
 161. Interview with Prosecutor No. 9, supra note 155. 
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their position on whether the demonstrations should have been 
allowed. One prosecutor said, “How big are the buttons?”162 Another, 
after hearing about Carey v. Musladin, replied, “Were they baby 
pictures on the buttons or adult pictures?”163 
 Lastly, the abolitionist prosecutors, also a very diverse group, 
encompassed almost all of the liberal and larger-city prosecutors 
interviewed. This group was by far the strongest in their beliefs. For 
example, when told about the spectators’ buttons in Carey v. 
Musladin, one prosecutor immediately said, “No. No–I wouldn’t 
allow that. Do I think it’s so overwhelmingly prejudicial? That’s so 
difficult to prove. But I would not allow sympathy votes because of 
victims in the courtroom.”164 Another noted, “[T]hese common links 
can unnecessarily speak to the jury throughout the trial and it’s not 
from a lawyer or someone that has been sworn in to testify.”165 One 
prosecutor explained, 
People think that defendants get too many rights. I don’t think so. I 
understand that people think that the victim is forgotten because the 
jury looks at the defendant all day. But speaking on behalf of the 
victim in trial is my job, not [the job of] the victim themselves.166 
Another laments, 
There’s a reason that the criminal justice system is supposed to be at 
arm’s length. With buttons and things you are trying to sway the 
jury, [symbolically] to get [a] message across [that is not expressly 
allowed]. I don’t know if you’ve ever been through voir dire, but 
seventy percent of the questions are “can you be fair,” “can you 
keep an open mind throughout the entire trial?” Why then you 
would allow that to happen indirectly [through buttons] is beyond 
me!167 
Still other abolitionists were less worried about the potential 
prejudice and more concerned about the practical implications of 
allowing the spectator conduct. For example, one prosecutor noted, 
“I’d ask them to take it off because it isn’t worth the case coming 
 
 162. Interview with Prosecutor No. 10, supra note 155. 
 163. Interview with Prosecutor No. 13 (Dec. 14, 2007). 
 164. Interview with Prosecutor No. 5 (Nov. 15, 2007). 
 165. Interview with Prosecutor No. 1 (Nov. 8, 2007). 
 166. Interview with Prosecutor No. 6 (Nov. 15, 2007). 
 167. Interview with Prosecutor No. 8 (Nov. 16, 2007). 
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back for something like that.”168 Another was influenced by his 
experience in a case he tried: “[The victim’s family] just didn’t get it. 
Their son was not totally innocent in the case [even though he was the 
one that was killed]. That was just one of the reasons I didn’t think 
they should wear those ribbons.”169 This prosecutor also mentioned 
that judges sometimes put the onus of correcting the practice on the 
prosecutor: 
When the judge called us into his chambers [to discuss the ribbon-
wearing family in the spectator’s gallery] he basically said, “I’m not 
going to tell these victims’ families that they cannot wear some 
common ribbons if they want to.” Then he turned to me, “But Mr. 
Prosecutor, I do think this is a dirty pull.” In truth, [the judge] didn’t 
want to be the bad guy.170 
*          *          * 
As this Part illustrates, courts and prosecutors have multiple 
perspectives of and varying opinions about spectator demonstrations. 
Particularly, defendants’ rights, victims’ rights, and the possible jury 
effects are at the forefront of this ongoing discussion. Part III tackles 
these issues and concludes that a complete ban on spectator 
demonstrations in criminal courtrooms is the only way to ensure the 
presumption of innocence. 
III.  THE UNACCEPTABLE RISK: ERODING THE  
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
Although many legal actors, including lower courts171 and 
judges,172 prosecutors,173 the concurring Justices in Carey v. 
Musladin,174 and defense attorneys,175 have some reservations about 
 
 168. Interview with Prosecutor No. 16 (Dec. 21, 2007). When the prosecutor said “have the 
case come back,” he was noting that if the trial court allowed the spectator display, the appellate 
court would reverse the conviction due to prejudice, and he would have to retry the case. 
 169. Interview with Prosecutor No. 1, supra note 165. 
 170. Id. 
 171. For a description of the positions of courts in the status-quo group and at least one of 
the courts in the unsettled group, see supra Parts I.C.1, 3. 
 172. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 173. For a description of the perspectives of prosecutors, see supra Part II.B. 
 174. See supra Part II.A. 
 175. See, e.g., Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 3, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006) (No.05-785), 2006 WL 
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spectator demonstrations, 176 some members of these groups are still 
reluctant to completely ban the practice. Two central legal concerns 
fuel this reluctance. First, Justice Souter and the supportive group of 
prosecutors, for example, are especially concerned about the victim’s 
or spectator’s potential right to free speech. Second, there are varying 
opinions regarding whether a courtroom display from the spectators’ 
gallery can actually affect the jury’s verdict. This Part addresses these 
legal issues by first dispelling the First Amendment argument that 
spectator rights must be balanced with a defendant’s rights and then, 
most importantly, arguing that spectator demonstrations do create 
remarkable potential for biased jury verdicts. 
A. The Unnecessary Balancing Act 
The First Amendment mandates that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”177 It is one of the people’s 
most cherished rights in the United States.178 Fittingly then, many 
supporters of spectator demonstrations are concerned that 
eliminating a victim’s or spectator’s right to demonstrate may 
constitute an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. Some 
advocate balancing the victim’s First Amendment right with the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and impartial jury,179 
and even Justice Souter noted in Carey v. Musladin, “[I]n the absence 
of developed argument it would be preferable not to decide whether 
the protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised 
by spectators’ buttons.”180 But, upon reviewing the law regarding the 
First Amendment in the criminal courtroom, it is evident that First 
Amendment rights succumb to other, more important trial interests. 
 
2430574 (“There is no conceivable version of a just and fair trial that includes the regular, 
deliberate intrusion of such [public displays of emotion by spectators] into the trial process.”). 
 176. In the minority are those who seemingly have no qualms with spectator 
demonstrations. For a description of the positions of pro-victim courts, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 177. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 178. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 381–
82 (1973) (“There is little need to reiterate that the freedoms of speech and of the press rank 
among our most cherished liberties.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Terri A. Belanger, Note, Symbolic Expression in the Courtroom: The Right to 
a Fair Trial Versus Freedom of Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 344–52 (1994) (discussing 
the exclusion of individuals from courtrooms and advocating for a balancing test of their First 
Amendment rights with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); see also Neb. Press Ass’n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (“The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign 
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to 
the other.”). 
 180. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
ELIZABETH.DOC 10/31/2008  1:20:04 PM 
2008] THE NEWEST SPECTATOR SPORT 301 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant “the 
right to a speedy and public trial.”181 In particular, the Court values 
the public aspect of the trial because it “assur[es] that the proceedings 
[are] conducted fairly to all concerned.”182 A public trial 
“discourage[s] perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions 
based on secret bias or partiality.”183 Consequently, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the right of the press to access the courtroom 
under the First Amendment.184 Nevertheless, the Court stated, “While 
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this 
important function in a democratic society its exercise must 
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the 
judicial process.”185 The Court recognized that sometimes the public 
aspect of the system may itself encourage misconduct, bias, or 
partiality, thereby violating the right to an impartial jury.186 
Consequently, after interpreting the Sixth Amendment to guarantee 
that every “verdict [is] based upon the evidence developed at the 
trial,”187 the Court has, in certain circumstances, excluded the media 
 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 182. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 570 (“We reaffirm that the guarantees of 
freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition [against excluding the press] under all 
circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use 
continues intact.”). 
 185. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539. 
 186. The Court has warned trial courts that news coverage poses a danger: 
[W]e note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become 
increasingly prevalent. . . . Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and 
the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial 
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against 
the accused. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
 187. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (reversing the defendant’s conviction after 
significant unfavorable publicity about his crime circulated in the community prior to trial). 
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and other third parties from the courtroom.188 Some courts have 
excluded spectators altogether.189 
Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Norris, spectator 
demonstrators request far different privileges than those who simply 
assert the right to receive information.190 Trial spectators seek a “more 
active role: to make a statement about [the defendant’s] guilt.”191 
Notably, this adjudicative speech, or “speech intended to influence 
court decisions,” is heavily constrained in the courtroom.192 In fact, 
some argue that a trial by definition is one vast restriction of speech. 
Take for example the following explanation: 
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there appears 
to be quite little free speech. There are elaborate rules about who 
goes when, about who speaks, and about who does not 
speak. . . . [T]he law of evidence that deals with relevance and 
materiality can [also] be thought of as a prohibition on speech, a 
prohibition on saying what (a judge believes) is irrelevant to the 
particular matter at hand. Those who persist in saying irrelevant 
things after a ruling by the judge risk punishment for contempt. 
  In much the same way, testimony at trial may be suppressed 
because the matters with which it deals were secured in violation of 
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, or because the testimony is 
hearsay, not the best evidence, or not preceded and supported by an 
 
 188. See, e.g., Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393–94 (1979) (upholding the trial 
court’s exclusion of the press from the courtroom). Likewise, the Court has chastised trial courts 
for allowing press coverage or involvement to become prejudicial. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. 
at 355, 362–63 (reversing the conviction because the enormous amount of publicity prevented 
the defendant from receiving a fair trial when “newsmen took over practically the entire 
courtroom”); Estes, 381 U.S. at 550, 552 (reversing a conviction in which the trial judge’s 
decision to televise the pretrial hearing and otherwise permit excessive media coverage 
prejudiced the defendant and noting that the courtroom “was a mass of wires, television 
cameras, microphones and photographers”). 
 189. The Second Circuit, for example, has accepted that courts may ban disorderly 
spectators from the courtroom: 
The guarantee of a public trial does not mean that all of the public is entitled under 
all circumstances to be present during the trial. It means only that the public must be 
freely admitted so long as those persons and groups who make up the public remain 
silent and behave in an orderly fashion . . . . When the trial judge has reason to 
believe that . . . spectators are disorderly and may continue to be so he may exclude 
[them]. 
United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 190. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
705, 705 (2004). 
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appropriate foundation. If we were to move our thinking about what 
happens at a trial away from the category ‘trials’ and into the 
category ‘free speech,’ it would appear that the very institution we 
call a trial exists by virtue of an elaborate system of restrictions on 
the freedom of speech . . . . 
  The point of the foregoing . . . is to illustrate the fact that our 
notion of freedom of speech is less expansive than we typically 
think . . . .193 
As this passage indicates, restrictions on adjudicative speech 
occur all the time in the courtroom, and courts do not find it 
constitutionally controversial.194 The Supreme Court’s justification in 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada195 supports this point. 
The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, 
who know as little as possible of the case, based on material 
admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding. . . . It is 
unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial 
proceeding, whatever right to “free speech” an attorney has is 
extremely circumscribed.196 
These sentiments emphasize that “conclusions to be reached in a case 
will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not 
by any outside influence.”197 Therefore, “in the interest of the fair 
administration of justice,”198 courts may impose “reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions”199 on spectator conduct. 
Consequently, the First Amendment “must be curtailed at the 
courthouse door”200 if society is to espouse the goal of producing fair 
trials for criminal defendants. 
 
 193. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 
689–90 (1997). 
 194. Peters, supra note 192, at 725. 
 195. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 196. Id. at 1070–01 (distinguishing between “in court” and “out of court” restrictions on 
speech); see also Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 928–29 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Under our current system, 
the trial judge is charged with preserving the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of 
issues. Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the First Amendment.”). 
 197. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 198. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980). 
 199. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 200. Id. at 832. 
ELIZABETH.DOC 10/31/2008  1:20:04 PM 
304 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:275 
B. Practical Implications: The Jury 
Although victims lack a First Amendment basis to argue for 
spectator demonstrations as a right, the question remains, can 
spectator demonstrations really make a difference in trial outcomes? 
Three concepts from the field of psychology—attention, priming 
effects, and the availability heuristic—provide evidence that spectator 
demonstrations will bias a jury. Furthermore, research suggests that 
these effects are uniform whether the demonstration is a ribbon, 
button, T-shirt, or urn. 
First, as the Court in Estes recognized, juror distraction may lead 
to prejudice,201 because jurors’ minds may focus on the distraction 
rather than the testimony.202 Attention plays a huge role in memory 
and therefore decisionmaking. One well-accepted theory of attention, 
the capacity model, assumes that the mind has a finite capacity for 
information at a given time.203 Consequently, the more attention used 
for one thing, such as reading spectator buttons, the less those 
resources are available for something else, such as evaluating the 
credibility of a witness. Furthermore, as various studies demonstrate, 
jurors already tend to pay attention to many things during the course 
of a trial that are irrelevant to the facts of the case. For example, the 
defendant’s attractiveness204 or race205 and the lawyer’s sex206 or 
 
 201. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 (1965). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT 7–8 (1973) (“[A] capacity theory 
assumes that there is a general limit on man’s capacity to perform mental work. It also assumes 
that this limited capacity can be allocated with considerable freedom among concurrent 
activities.”). 
 204. See, e.g., Billy Thornton, Effects of Rape Victim’s Attractiveness in a Jury Simulation, 3 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 666, 666 (1977) (testing the hypothesis that a rape 
victim’s attractiveness may influence the decisions of jurors and finding that it did affect the 
defendant’s punishment). 
 205. See, e.g., Michael J. Sargent & Amy L. Bradfield, Race and Information Processing in 
Criminal Trials: Does the Defendant’s Race Affect How the Facts are Evaluated?, 30 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 995, 1003 (2004) (“Consistent with the hypothesis 
that a defendant’s race could affect observers’ sensitivity to informational factors, the present 
studies demonstrated that under conditions designed to elicit relatively low motivation, the 
impact of legally relevant information was often greater when the defendant was Black than 
when he was White.”). 
 206. See, e.g., Nora K. Villemur & Janet Shibley Hyde, Effects of Sex of Defense Attorney, 
Sex of Juror, and Age and Attractiveness of the Victim on Mock Juror Decision Making in a Rape 
Case, 9 SEX ROLES 879, 885–86 (1983) (“The most striking result of this study was that 
significantly more not-guilty verdicts were given when the defense attorney was female (71%) 
than when the defense attorney was male (49%).”). 
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presentation style207 all distract the jury and potentially prejudice the 
jury’s decisionmaking. Unlike those factors, however, spectator 
conduct can be eliminated easily to prevent the possible biasing effect 
of the distraction. 
Second, a juror may not only be distracted from the case by 
attending to a spectator demonstration, but the display may also act 
as a prime for subsequent decisionmaking behavior. Priming refers to 
“a facilitation or bias in performance as the result of recently 
encountered information.”208 An experiment by Professors Morrison, 
Wheeler, and Smeesters helps to illustrate the concept.209 After 
distinguishing between high and low self-monitors (people who tend 
to use external cues and people who do not, respectively),210 the 
researchers presented the question, “How and under what conditions 
do significant others affect the goals that people pursue?”211 In the 
experiment, the researchers gathered participants whose mothers had 
high achievement goals for them but who did not have high 
achievement goals for themselves.212 Then, the researchers subjected 
them to a mother prime.213 For example, they asked the participants 
about their mother’s appearance, typical activities, and place of 
birth.214 The researchers found that the high self-monitors performed 
better than controls on a subsequent achievement test because when 
provided with an external cue (their mothers) they unconsciously 
 
 207. See, e.g., Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation 
Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 548 
(1996) (“Aggressive attorneys were found to be more successful than passive attorneys . . . .”). 
 208. R. REED HUNT & HENRY C. ELLIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
117 (7th ed. 2004). To illustrate priming, psychologists often use the example taken from an 
experiment by the scientist Marcel in 1980. E.g., id. at 84. The experiment asks the subject to 
“decide as rapidly as possible” whether a string of letters represents a word. Id. When the word 
doctor is presented, participants are much faster in recognizing it as a word when it was 
preceded by the word nurse rather than the word peach. Id. at 85. This suggests that the related 
word can contribute to the recognition of the next word. Id.  
 209. Kimberly Rios Morrison, S. Christian Wheeler & Dirk Smeesters, Significant Other 
Primes and Behavior: Motivation to Respond to Social Ques Moderates Pursuit of Prime-
Induced Goals, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 1661, 1664 (2007). 
 210. Id. at 1663 (“High self-monitors are social chameleons who tend to use external cues 
(e.g., from the situation, from other people) to guide their behavior. Low self-monitors, in 
contrast, rely primarily on internal cues, such as their attitudes and beliefs, in deciding how to 
behave.”). 
 211. Id. at 1671. 
 212. Id. at 1664. 
 213. Id. at 1665. 
 214. Id. 
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altered their behavior to match that of their mothers’ goals. 215 
Similarly, Professors Morrison, Wheeler, and Smeesters duplicated 
their results in an experiment with college students whose roommates 
wanted them to keep their living spaces clean.216 After a priming 
manipulation, the high self-monitors pursued the cleanliness goal 
even when they did not hold that goal for themselves.217 This research 
supports the theory that priming can alter one’s behavior and “[the 
level of] self-monitoring can moderate the extent to which external 
stimuli automatically affect behavior.”218 Applying both studies to jury 
behavior, one can foresee how spectators who visibly display their 
goals, such as convicting the defendant, can prime certain members of 
the jury and in turn unconsciously alter their behavior. 
Third, allowing spectator demonstrations from the gallery also 
disrupts the balance of the courtroom. The American criminal justice 
system is set up as an adversarial system, which “according to most 
definitions, consists of three features: a neutral and passive decision-
maker, party presentation of evidence, and a highly structured 
procedure.”219 Correspondingly, one of the main arguments in Payne 
v. Tennessee,220 the case favoring victim impact statements at 
sentencing hearings, was the importance of a balanced system. In 
comparing the defense to the prosecution, the Court said, “virtually 
no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital 
defendant may introduce.”221 Therefore, “[t]he State has a legitimate 
interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence.”222 This argument, 
that a fair system should assign a one-to-one ratio, is deeply rooted in 
the criminal justice process. For example, each side makes an opening 
statement, there are direct and cross examinations, and each side 
makes a closing statement. This balancing is not only equitable, but it 
also combats the availability heuristic. 
 
 215. Id. at 1665–66. 
 216. Id. at 1666. 
 217. Id. at 1666–69. 
 218. Id. at 1663; see also id. at 1673 (“[These findings] provide insight into [how] being 
reminded of mothers, roommates, and other important people will cause people to act in ways 
consistent (or sometimes even inconsistent) with what these individuals would like to see.”). 
 219. Stephen G. Coughlan, The “Adversary System”: Rhetoric or Reality?, CAN. J.L. & 
SOC’Y, Fall 1993, at 139, 142. 
 220. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 221. Id. at 822. 
 222. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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The availability heuristic states that a judgment can be 
“influenced by the ease with which something is brought to mind.”223 
For example, in the wake of a major airplane crash, people are more 
anxious about flying even though statistically it is the safest time to 
fly.224 The thought itself helps to bias the subsequent actions.225 
“[W]hatever most occupies juror attention during the trial will most 
influence what jurors focus on during deliberations and 
disproportionately use in rendering a verdict.”226 Notably, information 
that is presented early in the trial tends to “remain[] vivid and is more 
apt to be used for interpreting subsequent evidence.”227 Furthermore, 
in interpreting evidence, jurors tend to “construct a story that 
confirms their prior beliefs.”228 This data elucidates the importance of 
equality in the courtroom. If spectators’ buttons or T-shirts are 
allowed, a juror may disproportionately recall the hurt and 
devastation of the victim and their family or buttress their desire to 
seek justice for the family, which may in turn diminish the jurors’ 
ability to remain impartial. 
Given that the American criminal justice system otherwise goes 
to great lengths to avoid jury bias, jurors should ultimately make 
decisions based on the evidence at trial and not the sympathetic 
nature of the victim or the spectator’s loss. For example, the voir dire 
process and rules against the admission of the defendant’s previous 
crimes are meant to filter out potential bias229 and prevent the jury 
from acting on an irrational basis.230 It would be unjust to circumvent 
these goals by allowing prejudicial spectator demonstrations. 
Furthermore, because the display itself adds an element of 
distraction, may prime the jury, and may create an availability 
heuristic, employing a balancing test that allows certain or limited 
spectator demonstrations misses the point. T-shirts, buttons, or 
 
 223. HUNT & ELLIS, supra note 208, at 359.  
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.; see also Craig R. Fox, The Availability Heuristic in the Classroom: How Soliciting 
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 226. David A. Wenner & Gregory S. Cusimano, Combating Juror Bias, TRIAL, June 2000, at 
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 227. Id. at 37. 
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 229. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 167 (2008) (“The purpose of conducting voir dire is to secure an 
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 230. Peters, supra note 192, at 758. 
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urns—no matter how many exist—have the ability to take the focus 
away from the trial and bias the jury. Therefore, only a complete ban 
on spectator demonstrations can secure a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The presumption of innocence makes up the core of the 
American criminal justice system.231 Consequently, a victim’s right 
should never come at the expense of a defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Musladin, the law 
in this area is ripe for reform, and this Note contends that allowing 
spectator demonstrations in courtrooms creates a per se unacceptable 
risk. This Note does not dismiss the fact that victims’ rights should 
allow a victim to be present, heard, and respected throughout judicial 
proceedings. It simply recognizes that juries are “likely to be 
impregnated by the environing atmosphere,”232 and it mandates that 
“at the very least,”233 evidence should “come from the witness 
stand”234 and courtrooms should be free from “public passion.”235 
Spectator demonstrations contravene all of these principles. 
Juries must already combat prejudicial pitfalls that present 
themselves in the criminal justice system, and adding yet another 
temptation unrelated to the facts of the case is unwarranted. This 
Note urges courts to be mindful that although allowing spectator 
demonstrations give some victims comfort, the demonstrations only 
create more victims in the long run—those who end up in prison for 
someone else’s crime. 
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